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Abstract: 
 
While episodic memory declines with age, metacognitive monitoring is spared. The current study 
explored whether older adults can use their preserved metacognitive knowledge to make source 
guesses in the absence of source memory. Through repetition, words from two sources (italic vs. 
bold text type) differed in memorability. There were no age differences in monitoring this 
difference despite an age difference in memory. Older adults used their metacognitive 
knowledge to make source guesses but showed a deficit in varying their source guessing based 
on word recognition. Therefore, older adults may not fully benefit from metacognitive 
knowledge about sources in source monitoring.   
 
Keywords: Age Differences | Aging | Metacognition | Source Monitoring | Episodic Memory 
 
Article: 
 
  
Imagine you remember something but you cannot remember where you learned about it. Could 
you still judge what the source of that information is? Chances are you can, based on your 
knowledge about possible sources. According to the source-monitoring framework (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), if you cannot base a source judgment on memory for source 
features you may still be able to reason that there is only one plausible source (e.g., your friend 
who always tells odd facts like the one you are remembering). Knowing the source of 
information can be highly important, such as knowing if health advice came from your doctor (a 
good source) or your neighbor (usually a bad source). With age you become less likely to 
remember sources, so source judgment processes drawing on (accurate) knowledge about 
sources gain importance. 
 
Prior research demonstrates that young adults rely on political stereotypes (e.g., Mather, 
Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1999), learned correlations (e.g., Meiser & Hewstone, 2004), and 
schematic knowledge about professions (e.g., Bayen, Nakamura, Dupuis, & Yang, 2000) when 
making source judgments in the absence of source memory. Recently, Meiser, Sattler, and von 
Hecker (2007) added reliance on metacognitive knowledge to this line of research. They 
experimentally created differences in word memory between two sources. Using model-based 
analysis they then examined source responses in the absence of memory for source features (i.e., 
source guesses). Student participants monitored the source differences in item memory and were 
more likely to guess that an unrecognized item came from the source with lower item-memory 
than a recognized item. 
 
Source memory is particularly impaired in old age, more so than simple item memory (see Old & 
Naveh-Benjamin, 2008, for a meta-analysis). Therefore, older adults will often have to rely on 
their knowledge about sources when making source judgments. In contrast to the age deficits in 
memory, older adults are able to monitor their memory performance as well as young adults (see 
Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000, for a review). Can older adults use their preserved metacognitive 
knowledge when making source attributions without memory for source features? This seems 
likely given that older adults have been shown to rely on general knowledge (e.g., stereotypes) 
when making source attributions (Mather et al., 1999). But older adults have not always been 
found to use their metacognitive knowledge effectively (e.g., when allocating study time, 
Dunlosky & Connor, 1997; but see Hines, Touron, & Hertzog, 2009). That is, there may be 
impairment in the use of metacognitive knowledge, possibly rendering older adults unable to use 
this preserved knowledge in source monitoring. 
 
The purpose of the current study was to examine older adults' use of metacognitive knowledge in 
a source monitoring task. By selectively repeating words from one source we created differences 
in word memory between two sources (cf. Meiser et al., 2007). We expected older adults to 
monitor this source difference in word memory as well as young adults. Replicating Meiser et 
al., we further expected young adults to use this metacognitive knowledge when making source 
attributions in the absence of source memory by varying their source guessing between 
recognized and unrecognized words. Specifically, we expected them to be highly biased to guess 
that unrecognized words came from the source with lower word memory while this bias should 
be reduced for recognized words. We also included a control condition with words of each text 
type studied only once to demonstrate that such a bias only occurs when word memory differs 
between sources. We expected older adults to monitor source differences in word memory as 
well as young adults but given mixed prior findings it was unclear whether they would be able to 
use this knowledge for source guessing. 
 
METHOD 
 
Design and Participants 
 
The design was a 2 (source) × 2 (condition) × 2 (age group) mixed factorial. Source (italic vs. 
bold text type) was manipulated within participants. Condition was manipulated between 
participants. In the all-once condition all words were studied once. In the once-thrice condition 
italic words were studied once and bold words were studied three times, creating source 
differences in word memory that participants may rely on during source judgments. Sixty young 
adults and 60 older adults were randomly assigned to the two conditions. Young adults (18–22 
years of age, M = 18.5) were undergraduates participating for course credit. Older adults (60–75 
years of age, M = 67.2) were community-dwelling volunteers receiving monetary compensation 
($10 per hour). Participants were prescreened for sufficient visual acuity (at least 20/50) and 
health-related impediments. Sample characteristics were consistent with typical findings. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
 
After signing a consent form, participants completed a few short measures to assess sample 
characteristics. Then the computerized source-monitoring task presented instructions on the 
screen. Before studying, participants received detailed information about the memory test, 
emphasizing the importance of remembering not only the words but also their text type. In the 
study phase, 50 words were randomly sampled from a word pool of 100 high frequency, one- or 
two-syllable English nouns. Half of the sampled words were then randomly assigned to either 
text type (italic or bold). In the all-once condition, the order of presentation of the words was 
random with the restriction that there were no more than three consecutive words in the same 
text type. For the once-thrice conditions, order of presentation of the words was random with the 
restriction that there were at least two intervening words between the repetitions of a bold word 
and that there were no consecutive italic words for the first three quarters of the lists (to equally 
distribute non-repeated italic words throughout the study list). Words appeared at the center of 
the screen in 30 pt bolded or italicized Arial font for 3 seconds. After studying a word, 
participants were prompted to indicate how confident they were that they would remember the 
just seen word at the end of the experiment on a scale from 0% (definitely will not remember) to 
100% (definitely will remember). During these self-paced judgments of learning (JOLs) the 
previously studied word was not visible. A 200-ms centered fixation cross appeared before the 
next word. After the study list, participants were prompted to count backwards in 3's for 1 min. 
Then participants entered the last number they were at and continued with the memory-test 
instructions. 
 
In the self-paced memory test, the 50 studied words and the 50 remaining (i.e., unstudied) words 
from the word pool appeared one at a time in the center of the screen in a random order. Words 
were presented in standard text type and in a different font than at study. Participants first 
determined whether a word had been on the studied lists of words. Two response fields labeled 
“Yes (old word)” and “No (new word)” appeared side by side underneath the test word. Once 
participants clicked a response field with the computer mouse it turned red. Participants then 
clicked a field labeled “RECORD” at the center bottom of the screen knowing that once recorded 
no further change could be made. If a word was judged to be old, participants were asked to 
determine whether it had been presented in italic or bold text. Responses were made as before 
with two response fields underneath the test word. In the all-once condition these were labeled 
“italic” and “bold.” In the once-thrice condition this judgment was equivalent to judging if a 
word had been studied once or thrice; consequently response fields were labeled as “once/italic” 
and “thrice/bold.” Once the text type response was logged, the next test word appeared. If a word 
was judged to be new, the next test word appeared immediately. All response field positions 
were counterbalanced across participants. Upon completing the memory test, participants filled 
out a paper-based questionnaire containing difficulty ratings for making the old-new and text-
type judgment for bold and italic words, with a Likert scale from 1 (not at all difficult) to 7 (very 
difficult)). 
 
RESULTS 
 
Metacognitive Monitoring 
 
For each participant the mean JOLs for italic and bold words were calculated, averaged across 
the three repetitions of bold words in the once-thrice condition. Means are displayed in Table 1. 
The mean JOLs were then submitted to a 2 (source) × 2 (condition) × 2 (age group) repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). There was a main effect of age group because older 
adults gave higher JOLs than young adults, F(1, 116) = 7.53, p < .01, ηp2 = .05. There was a 
main effect of source with lower JOLs for italic than for bold words, F(1, 116) = 113.93, p < .01, 
ηp2 = .5. This effect was qualified by an interaction of source and condition indicating that the 
mean difference in JOLs for italic and bold words was larger in the once-thrice condition than in 
the all-once condition, F(1, 116) = 27.99, p < .01, ηp2 = .19. That is, participants in the once-
thrice condition detected the source differences in word memory and gave lower JOLs for italic 
than for bold words. The absence of an interaction with age group implies that both age groups 
were equally sensitive to the once-thrice manipulation. This was also supported by a lack of age 
differences in relative accuracy of JOLs as measured by mean gamma correlations between JOL 
and recognition accuracy (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 also lists participants' estimates of item recognition difficulty for italic and bold words, 
which were in line with the JOL analyses. In addition participants' perceived difficulty of making 
the source judgment for bold and italic words (Table 1) was analyzed with a 2 (source) × 2 
(condition) × 2 (age group) mixed ANOVA. Older adults perceived the source judgment as more 
difficult, F(1, 115) = 11.46, p < .01, ηp2 = .09. A significant main effect of source reflected 
higher perceived difficulty of making the source judgment for italic words than for bold 
words, F(1, 115) = 31, p < .01, ηp2 = .21. This effect was qualified by a source x condition 
interaction with a bigger difference in perceived difficulty of the source judgment for italic 
relative to bold words in the once-thrice condition, F(1, 115) = 9.63, p < .01, ηp2 = .08. That is, 
participants believed that it would be more difficult to remember the source of italic words 
compared with bold words and this difference in perceived difficulty was stronger in the once-
thrice condition. This pattern did not differ between age groups. 
 
 
 
Model-Based Analyses of Source Judgments 
 
Primary analyses were conducted with the two-high threshold multinomial processing tree 
(MPT) model of source monitoring (Bayen, Murnane, & Erdfelder, 1996; Figure 1). This model 
allows the separate estimation of source memory and source-response biases that are confounded 
in hit-based measures (cf. Murnane & Bayen, 1996). In Figure 1, participant responses at test 
(right side) are linked to the test stimuli (left side) via parameters reflecting distinct cognitive 
processes. Imagine a participant is tested on a word previously studied in italic text type (top 
tree). With probability Ditalic the participant recognizes the word. With probability ditalic the 
participant also remembers the source (italic) of the word. If the source is not remembered, the 
participant has to make a guess since the task requires a source judgment for every old word. 
With probability a, the guess is “italic.” With the complementary probability (1 − a), the guess is 
“bold,” a false response. If the word is not recognized (with probability (1 − Ditalic)), the 
participant may guess that the word is old (with probability b) or new (probability (1 − b)). The 
model assumes that there is no source memory if there is no memory for the word. Hence, if the 
participant guesses a word is old the source must be guessed as well. With probability g the 
guess is “italic”; with the complementary probability (1 − g) the guess is “bold.” This 
demonstration shows that there are several cognitive paths to the correct answer (“italic”) based 
on distinct cognitive processes. Parameter interpretation is equivalent for bold test items (middle 
tree) and distracters (bottom tree). Parameters are estimated via maximum-likelihood estimation 
from the response frequencies aggregated across words and participants (Batchelder & Riefer, 
1990, 1999; raw data in Appendix). Goodness of fit of the model to empirical data is evaluated 
with the χ2-distributed log-likelihood ratio statistic G2 (Hu & Batchelder, 1994). All analyses 
were conducted with the multiTree software (Moshagen, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
The model as depicted in Figure 1 has more parameters than degrees of freedom in the data and 
is thus mathematically not identifiable. Two parameter restrictions were made for the analysis of 
the present data (cf., Meiser et al., 2007): (1) Word memory was expected to be higher for 
bold/thrice words (Dbold) as opposed to italic/once words (Ditalic) in the once-thrice conditions, 
thus requiring free word memory parameters. Distractor detection (DNew) was assumed to be 
limited by the lower bound of recognition memory and thus set equal to Ditalic.1 (2) Equal source 
memory for the two text types was assumed (ditalic  =  dbold  =  d).  The final model has six free 
parameters: Word memory for italic words (Ditalic = DNew), word memory for bold words (Dbold), 
source memory (d), old-new guessing (b), source guessing for recognized words (a), and source 
guessing for unrecognized words (g). With six degrees of freedom in the data, this model is 
saturated and will thus always fit the data perfectly with G
2
(0) = 0, p = 1.00. Parameter 
estimates are displayed in Table 1. No further parameter restrictions could be made in all 
conditions so this saturated model was used as a common baseline model. However, additional 
analyses ensured that testable overidentified submodels (see Bayen et al., 1996) fit the data from 
each condition well.2 Parameter estimates from these overidentified models were in line with 
those in the saturated model. The fit of an overidentified model in each condition assures that the 
2 HT MPT model is adequate for the present data. Because we cannot assess fit for the saturated 
model, we cannot compare alternative models for this data but we can nonetheless use this model 
as a measurement tool for the cognitive processes of interest. 
 
As expected, word memory for italic and bold words did not differ in the all-once conditions for 
any age group, both G2(1) ≤ 3.24, p > .07. In the once-thrice conditions, word memory was 
significantly lower for italic/once as opposed to bold/thrice words, G2(1) = 129.94, p < .01 for 
young adults and G2(1) = 191.63, p < .01, for older adults. That is, the once-thrice manipulation 
was successful in creating source differences in word memory. In all conditions, older adults' 
word memory was lower than young adults', all G2(1) ≥ 7.11, p < .01. Older adults' source 
memory was also lower than young adults' in both conditions, both G2(1) ≥ 4.53, p ≤ .03. 
 
Of main interest to the present analysis are the source-guessing probabilities for recognized and 
unrecognized words because these reflect source judgments in the absence of source memory. In 
the all-once condition these were not expected to differ from each other and to be unbiased (.5). 
In the once-thrice condition participants relying on metacognitive knowledge should be more 
likely to attribute unrecognized (but guessed to be old) words to the source with low word 
memory (i.e., italic/once; parameter g) than recognized words (parameter a). As expected, 
source-guessing did not differ for unrecognized and recognized words in the all-once condition 
for either age group, both G2(1) ≤ 1.82, p ≥ .18. All source-guessing parameters were at .5, 
meaning that participants split guesses equally between the two text types, all G2(1) ≤ 2.9, p ≥ 
.09. For young adults in the once-thrice condition, guessing “italic/once” was significantly higher 
for unrecognized than for recognized words, G2(1) = 8.92, p < .01. Both source-guessing 
parameters were significantly above .5, G2(1) = 5.99, p = .01, for recognized words (parameter a) 
and G2(1) = 54.45, p < .01, for unrecognized words (parameter g). This means, in the absence of 
source memory, young adults in the once-thrice condition were more likely to attribute words to 
the source with lower word memory (i.e., italic/once) and this bias was stronger for unrecognized 
words. For older adults in the once-thrice condition, guessing “italic/once” did not differ for 
unrecognized and recognized words, G2(1) = 0.42, p = .52. Both source-guessing parameters 
were significantly above .5, G2(1) = 72.5, p < .01, for recognized words (parameter a), and G2(1) 
= 68.15, p = .01, for unrecognized words (parameter g). That is, in the absence of source 
memory, older adults in the once-thrice condition were more likely to attribute words to the 
source with lower word memory (i.e., italic/once) and this bias was equally strong for 
unrecognized and recognized words. In other words, older adults made their source judgments as 
if unrecognized and recognized words were equally likely to come from the italic/once source 
while young adults took into account that unrecognized words were more likely to come from 
this source than recognized words. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The biased source guessing in the once-thrice conditions shows that both young and older adults 
use their metacognitive knowledge when making source judgments. When sources differed in 
word memory young adults attributed most unrecognized items to the source with lower word 
memory if they could not remember the source. This bias was reduced for recognized items, 
which are less likely to stem from the source with lower word memory. Older adults did not 
differentiate their source guessing strategy based on word memory and were equally biased 
towards the source with lower item memory for recognized and unrecognized words. Source 
guessing was not biased towards either source in the all-once conditions. 
 
The metacognitive monitoring data suggest spared monitoring in the older adult sample (e.g., 
Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000). JOLs were reasonably calibrated with gamma correlations above 0 in 
all conditions for both age groups (gammas were a bit lower numerically for older adults in the 
once-thrice condition compared to younger adults, but the difference was not reliable). Older 
adults' overall higher JOLs suggest they are more confident in their recognition ability than 
younger adults but for both age groups mean JOLs are well below the objective level of 
recognition (parameter D). Of even more current importance than age comparisons of overall 
monitoring accuracy and memory confidence is the finding that older adults assigned higher 
average JOLs to bold than to italic items in the once-thrice condition. This pattern of JOLs as 
well as the global difficulty judgments suggests that older adults monitored the difference in item 
memory between sources in the once-thrice condition well, which is most crucial for the 
interpretation of our source guessing results. 
 
Despite similar metacognitive beliefs, young and older adults differ in their source-guessing 
pattern. Older adults fail to differentiate their source guessing for unrecognized and recognized 
words. Knowing that memory will be worse for italic items implies a larger guessing bias 
towards guessing “once/italic” for unrecognized than for recognized items. Since older adults are 
equally biased towards the source with low item memory for unrecognized as for recognized 
items, their source guessing is suboptimal given their metacognitive beliefs. Young adults show 
this reduction in bias based on the level of item recognition but are still slightly biased towards 
guessing “italic/once” for recognized items. This residual bias was also found in Meiser et al. 
(2007; Experiments 1 and 2). If sources are only believed to differ in item memory, guessing for 
recognized items should be biased towards the source with higher item memory (thrice/bold 
here). A residual bias towards the source with lower item memory for recognized items would 
only be warranted if participants also believed that source memory is worse for this source. 
Participants of both age groups likely believed that the repetition manipulation affected source 
memory similarly to item memory because making the source judgment was perceived to be 
more difficult for the italic than the bold source in the once-thrice condition. Although we did 
not include a measure directly assessing beliefs about source memory, a measure directly 
assessing beliefs about item memory (JOLs) and the related post-task difficulty judgment were 
similar. It is mathematically impossible to estimate both source memory for italic and bold items 
and source guessing for unrecognized and recognized words freely in the MPT model. In the 
analyses, source memory was restricted to be equal across text types (cf., Meiser et al.). For older 
adults in the once-thrice condition we could actually confirm that source memory did not differ 
since source guessing was equal for recognized and unrecognized words, ditalic = 0.54, dbold = 
0.64, G2(1) = 0.42, p = .52. That is, young and older adults' source guessing was possibly 
influenced by false beliefs about source memory. Regardless of whether source memory differs 
between text types, knowledge about the source differences in word memory implies a change of 
guessing strategy for unrecognized and recognized words which was only observed in young but 
not in older participants. 
 
A core assumption in our analysis and all multinomial models of source memory is that in the 
absence of item memory participants also cannot have source memory and must guess the source 
(e.g., Bayen et al., 1996; Dodson, Holland, & Shimamura, 1998; Klauer & Wegener, 1998; 
Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Riefer, Hu, & Batchelder, 1994). Recently, Starns, Hicks, Brown, and 
Martin (2008) demonstrated that source memory for unrecognized items can be above chance if 
participants are encouraged to adopt a very strict recognition criterion. Cook, Marsh, and Hicks 
(2006) provide evidence for some source memory on unrecalled items for which participants 
generally had substantial recognition memory. This partial item memory for unrecalled items 
likely contributed to the source memory results. Indeed, Cook et al. conclude that context 
information is very strongly bound to item information (see also Starns & Hicks, 2008). In the 
current study, we did not influence our participants' recognition criterion and our obtained source 
guessing parameter (parameter g) is equivalent for unrecognized items and distractor items for 
which there cannot be any source memory. Therefore, we conclude that source memory for 
unrecognized items in our paradigm is unlikely to be substantial and that source attributions for 
unrecognized items are mainly driven by source guessing. 
 
The present findings are in line with the view of spared metacognitive monitoring but impaired 
use of such knowledge with age (e.g., Dunlosky & Connor, 1997). In the present experimental 
set up full use of metacognitive knowledge required a switch of guessing strategy between 
recognized and unrecognized words. Given that older adults show greater costs associated with 
switching between tasks (e.g., Mayr, 2001), they may have avoided switching response strategies 
in this experiment. If this is the case, older adults may only effectively use their metacognitive 
knowledge in source monitoring if it implies one overall consistent response strategy. The once-
thrice manipulation inevitably made the study list longer (by 2.5 minutes). Though processing of 
repeated items should be easier this longer study duration may have particularly impacted older 
adults, possibly leaving them less capable to engage in more effortful strategy switching at test. 
Alternatively, the beliefs about source memory may have caused older adults' lack of 
differentiation. Possibly, older adults focused on the lack of source rather than word memory 
when making source attributions. In this case, older adults might be able to vary their response 
strategy for recognized and unrecognized words if they only perceive source differences in word 
(but not source) memory. Finally, while our results support the assumption of spared 
metacognitive monitoring during study (see Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000) there is evidence that 
older adults' monitoring during a memory test may be impaired (e.g., Kelley & Sahakyan, 2003, 
but also see MacLaverty & Hertzog, 2009). Older adults may have resorted to a non-changing 
strategy because they were not able to distinguish unrecognized from recognized items at test. 
 
Older adults can reject a source based on recollected evidence incompatible with it (recall-to-
reject) and can use the absence of expected distinct recollections to infer a source (distinctiveness 
heuristic; Gallo, Cotel, Moore, & Schacter, 2007). In our paradigm, participants were required to 
monitor the level of item recognition to infer the source in the absence of recollection. Older 
adults might have more problems monitoring familiarity-based recognition as opposed to 
monitoring recollection-based memory. Older adults' recollection-based memory monitoring is 
not completely spared either and varies with task aspects (Gallo, Bell, Beier, & Schacter, 2006; 
Gallo et al., 2007). In Gallo et al. (2007), older adults used both recollection-monitoring 
strategies within one task; however, use of the strategies was highly supported by the task format 
(prompted with differing test questions), which was not the case in our paradigm. 
 
In summary, the current findings suggest that older adults rely on metacognitive knowledge 
when making source judgments. However, older adults appear unable to vary their response 
strategy based on level of word memory, resulting in less efficient use of their metacognitive 
knowledge. Consequently, older adults might benefit mostly from metacognitive knowledge in 
source monitoring if this knowledge implies a consistent source-response strategy. 
 
FOOTNOTES 
 
1 Following Meiser et al. (2007), we assume that distractor detection is limited by the lower 
bound of target item recognition; that is, item recognition for italic items that is expected to be 
lower than for bold items in the once-thrice conditions. Setting distractor detection equal to the 
higher item recognition parameter Dbold in the once-thrice conditions leads to problems in 
fitting the model with the saturated model’s G2(0) > 0 because parameters would be at the 
boundary of the parameter space and thus inestimable. It is noteworthy that item recognition was 
fairly successful even for once presented items so that the lower bound for distractor detection 
was still allowed to be rather good despite this restriction. In the all-once conditions item 
recognition is equal for italic and bold items and results are the same if the alternative restriction 
(DNew = Dbold) is chosen. 
 
2 Both all-once conditions: Good fit of model with restrictions Ditalic = Dbold = DNew, ditalic = dbold, 
and g = a, G2(2) = 5.23 for young and G2(2) = 1.51 for old, both p > .05, G2(2)crit = 5.99. 
Young, once-thrice condition: Good fit of model with restrictions Ditalic = DNew = D in all-once 
condition (.72); and ditalic = dbold, G2(1) = 1.19, p > .05, G2(1)crit = 3.84. Old, once-thrice 
condition: Good fit of model with restrictions Ditalic = DNew, ditalic = dbold, and g = a, G2(1) = 1.83, 
p > .05, G2(1)crit = 3.84. Tests conducted on source guessing parameters in these overidentified 
models lead to the same conclusions as in the saturated model. 
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